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SERVICE AS A REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS IN 
ACTIONS IN PERSONAM 
· A PRIME requisite of due process is, of course, that the court 
shall have jurisdiction of the subject-matter. "To give such 
proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its 
constitution-that is, by the law of its creation-to pass upon the 
subject-matter of the suit."1 In proceedings in personam-proceed-
ings to determine the personal liability of the defendant, no prop-
erty being brought by the proceedings within the control of the 
court-the court must also have jurisdiction of the defendant. 
Attempts have repeatedly been made to take jurisdiction of non-
resident defendants through service by publication or through per-
sonal service made outside of the state in which the action is brought. 
The Supreme Court has held that such procedure does not give 
jurisdiction of the non-resident, for a state cannot in that way 
extend its jurisdiction beyond its territorial limits. The defendant 
"must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process in the 
State, or by his voluntary appearance."2 
Since a state may exclude a foreign corporation (except when it 
desires to engage in interstate commerce, or to act in the state for 
the Federal govemment) 3 it may compel such corporation as a con-
dition of entrance to appoint an agent in the state upon whom serv-
ice may be made, and such service will give jurisdiction.4 The stat-
ute may, however, simply provide that if a corporation does busi-
ness in the state, service may be made upon one of its agents in the 
state, or upon a state officer. Such statutes have been upheld either 
upon the theory of implied consent to such service, 5 or upon the 
theory that the corporation, having voluntarily come into the state 
to do business there, is bound by the state's reasonable regulations 
1 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 733. 
2 Ibid.; Harkness v. Hyde, g8 U. S. 476; Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U. S. 
41 ; Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. l8g. 
3 Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181 ; Hooper v. Cali-
fornia, 155 U. S. 648. 
4 Pennsylvania F. Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining and Milling Co., 243 U. 
s. 93. 
G Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 Howard (U. S.) 404. 
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of such business.6 It has also been held _that to require a corpora-
tion engaged in interstate commerce to appoint an agent upon whom 
service may be made in controversies arising within the state is not 
an unreasonable burden upon interstate commerce ;7 ·but, if the stat-
ute attempts to compel such a corporation to subject itself to the 
jurisdiction of the state courts in all controversies wherever arising, 
this would probably be held to burden interstate commerce unrea-
sonably. 8 
Under the "privileges and immunities" clause of Article Four 
of the Constitution a natural person, a citizen of one of the states, 
cannot be excluded from doing business in any other state.9 A 
Kentucky statute provides that "in actions against an individual 
residing in another State * * * engaged in business in this State, a 
summons may be served upon the manager, or agent of, or person 
in charge of, such business in this State, in the County where the 
business is carried on, or in the County where the cause of action 
occurred."10 Upon a cause of action which arose in Kentucky, an 
action was brought against non-resident partners who had done 
business in Kentucky through W. Flexner as their agent, process 
being served upon W. Flexner, who at the time of the service had 
ceased to be such agent. Judgment was obtained in Kentucky and 
sued upon in Illinois, where the court gave judgment for the defend-
ant, which was affirmed by the supreme court of the state.11 The 
case was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States on the 
ground that full faith and credit was not given to the Kentucky 
judgment. Justice Holmes in his brief opinion, affirming the judg-
ment of the Illinois court, said :12 
"It is argued that the pleas tacitly admit that Washington 
Flexner was agent of the firm at the time of the transaction 
s Smolik v. Philadelphia and R Coal and Iron Co., 222 Fed. 148, approved 
in Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining and Mi1ling Co., 243 
u. s. 93. 
7 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579. 
s See Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U. S. 197· 
9 Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wallace (U.S.) 418, 430; Blake v. McClung, 
172 u. s. 239. ' 
10 Kentucky Civil Code, sec. 51 (6). 
11 Flexner v. Farson, 268 Ill. 435. 
12 Flexner v. Farson, 248 U. S. 28g. 
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sued upon in Kentucky, and the Kentucky statute is con-
strued as purporting to make him agent to receive service 
in suits arising out of the business done in that State. On 
this construction it is said that the defendants by doing busi-
ness in the State consented to be bound by the service pre-
scribed. The analogy of suits against insurance companies 
based upon such service is invoked. Mtitual Reserve F1md 
Life Association v. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147· But the consent 
that is said to be implied in such cases is a mer~ fiction, 
founded upon the accepted doctrine that the States could 
exclude foreign corporations altogether, and therefore could 
establish this obligation as a condition to letting them in. 
Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404. Pennsylvania 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining and Milling Co., 243 U. 
S. 93, 96. The State had no power to exclude the defendants 
and on that ground without going farther the Supreme Court 
of Illinois rightly held that the analogy failed, and that the 
Kentucky judgment was void. If the Kentucky statute pur-
ports to have the effect attributed to it, it cannot have that 
effect ~n the present case. New York Life Insurance Co. v. 
Dunlevy, 241 U. S. 518, 522, 523/' 
Probably the justifiable deduction from this opinion is that, in 
the case of a natural person, a citizen of another state, no service 
will give jurisdiction, .except personal service within the state or 
voluntary appearance, unless actually consented to by the defend-
ant. Yet we have seen that a reasonable regulation as to service of 
process upon a foreign corporation entering to engage in interstate 
commerce may be imposed, though the corporation cannot be 
excluded from the state. Similarly, a regulation as to natural per-
sons entering to do business within the state, providing for service 
of process upon an agent in the state where a cause of action arises 
within the state, would seem not to deny such persons any privilege 
or immunity of citizens of the· state, but rather to put them on an 
equal footing with such citizens. In Kane v. New J ersey13 a state 
statute requiring that a non-resident automobile owner should, 
before operating his car in the state, appoint the Secretary of State 
13 242 U. S. I6o. 
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his agent upon whom process might be served in any action arising 
out of the operation of his car in the state, was held constitutional. 
It is possible that Fle.x-ner v. Farson will be ultimately held to stand 
only for the proposition that there was no jurisdiction of the 
defendants because W. Flexner was, at the time of service, no longer 
their agent.14 
A resident of one of the states of the Union who is a citizen of 
the United States is also a citizen of the state in which he resides.15 
But a person may also, of course, be domiciled in a state who is a 
citizen of a foreign country. IWhether a person is a citizen of the 
state or not, the state clearly may authorize its courts to take juris-
diction of him when he is within the state. By the common law, 
jurisdiction in a proceeding in personam was acquired by personal 
service upon the defendant within the jurisdiction; if he could not 
be found, pressure was brought upon him to appear by proceedings 
in outlawry.16 "One thing our law would not do, the obvious thing. 
It would exhaust its terrors in the endeavor to make the defendant 
appear, but it would not give judgment against him until he had 
appeared. * * * Instead of saying to the defaulter, 'I don't care 
whether you appear or no,' it set its will against his will: 'But you 
shall appear.' "17 The practice, however, has been very generally 
. adopted by our state legislatures of allowing substituted service of 
process, by leaving it at the defendant's residence, or of allowing 
constructive service by publication, in cases where the defendant 
cannot be found and personally served. It is believed that substi-
tuted service has been held due process and to give the court juris-
diction, where the defendant is domiciled in and is actually within 
the state, in all cases where the constitutional question has been 
considered in the state courts. Such service is treated as on the 
same footing with personal service.18 The verdict of the state 
14 For a very interesting discussion of this subject, see Scott, ."Jurisdic-
tion over Nonresidents Doing Business within a State," 32 HARV. L. Rsv. 
871, to which the writer acknowledges his indebtedness in connection with 
the preceding part of the discussion. 
ia Const. of U. S., Amend. XIV, Sec. I. 
1a 3 Black. Comm. 283. 
17 Perry, Common-law Pleading, I5I. 
is Bimeler v. Dawson, 5 Ill. 536; Biesenthall v. Williams, I Duv. (Ky.) 
329; Cassidy v. Leitch, 2 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 315; Continental Nat. Bk v. 
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courts is also that constructive service by publication is due process 
and gives the court jurisdiction as against a defendant domiciled 
in and actually within the state, on the ground that such a person 
owes obedience t9 the laws of the state, and the state has a right to 
prescribe by law how· he shall be brought into its courts, as long as 
the methods used are reasonably probable to apprise him of the pro-
ceedings,19 although it is very reasonably insisted in one case that 
such servic~ is not due process except when it appears that defend-
ant could not be found within the jurisdiction and personally 
served.20 
It is not easy to determine the position of the Supreme Court of 
the United States with regard to the validity of substituted service 
and of constructive service by publication upon persons domiciled 
in and actually within the state, in actions in persona11i. In Webster 
v. Reid21 commissioners appointed to partition certain Indian lands 
sued the owners and had process served by publication according 
to the laws of the territory. The Supreme Court held the judgment 
void, declaring that the "suits were not a proceeding in rem against 
the land but were in personani against the owners of it. Whether 
they all resided within the territory or not does not appear, nor is 
Thurber, 74 Hun. (N. Y.) 632, affirmed on opinion below in 143 N. Y. 648; 
Bernhardt v. Brown, II8 N. C. 700; Bryant v. Shute's Ex'r., 147 Ky. 268, 
and cases cited at p. 275 of the opinion. 
19 Holt v. Alloway, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) I08; Welch v. Sykes, 8 Ill. 197; 
Matter of Empire City Bk., 18 N. Y. 199; Harryman & Schryver v. Roberts, 
52 Md. 64; Betancourt v. Eberlin, 71 Ala. 461 (action commenced by attach-
ment treated as an action in person am) ; Bardwell v. Collins, 44 Minn. 97 
(foreclosure action treated as action in personam). In Bickerdike v. Allen, 
157 Ill. 95, the court held that in an action in personam service by publica-
tion is not sufficient, but that if process is also mailed to defendant's resi-
dence this is prima facie evidence that he received it, and therefore such 
service is prima facie valid. 
"That a man is entitled to some notice before he can be deprived of his 
liberty or property, is an axiom of the law to which no citations of authority 
would give additional weight; but upon the question of the length of such 
notice there is a singular dearth of judicial decision. It is manifest that the 
requirement of notice would be of no value whatever unless such notice 
were reasonable and adequate for the purpose." Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 
398, 409. 
20 Bardwell v. Collins, 44 Minn. 97. 
21 (1850) II Howard 437. 
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it a matter of any importance. No person is required to answer in 
a suit on whom process has not been served, or whose property has 
not been attached. In this case there was no personal notice, nor 
an attachment or other proceeding against the land until after the 
judgments. The judgments therefore are mere nullities and did 
not authorize the executions on which the land was sold." This 
seems a pretty explicit decision against service by publication in 
an action strictly personal, whether the defendant is a resident within 
the state or not. In Knowles v. Gaslight & Coke Company22 the 
court said, merely by way of dictuni: "We do not mean to say that 
personal service is in all cases necessary to enable a citizen to acquire 
jurisdiction of the person. When the defendant resides in tlie State 
in which the proceedings are had, service at his residence and per-
haps other modes of constructive service may be authorized by the 
law of the State." In Earle v. McVeigh23 the court had before it a 
case where service was attempted by posting on the door of defend-
ant's former residence, he having been seven months out of the 
state. The court held that the house in question was not defend-
ant's "usual place of abode" as required by the state statute, and 
that the service was, therefore, invalid. But the court said, "Doubt-
less constructive notice may ·be sufficient in certain cases," and appar-
ently approved of service.at the actual place of residence of one dom-
iciled in the state. The next case is that of Pennoyer v. N eff,24- in 
which the action was against a non-resident and in which service by 
publication was held insufficient. The court's discussion is directed 
to the question before it, but it quotes with approval the statement 
quoted above from Webster v. Reid and declares in general language 
that in an action in personam the defendant "must be brought within 
its jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or his volun-
tary appearance."25 The next year the Supreme Court had before 
it a case where the action was one in personam, and in which process 
was served by leaving it at defendant's residence with his wife. A 
state statute authorized such service if defendant could not be found. 
There was no averment in the sheriff's return that he could not 
22 (1873) 19 Wallace 58, 61. 
23 (1875) 91 u. s. 503. 
24 (1877) 95 u. s. 714-
25 Ibid. 733. 
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find defendant. For this reason the judgment was held void. The 
court said, "Substitute service in actions purely in personani was a 
departure from the rule of the common law, and the authority for 
it, if it could be allowed at all, must have been strictly followed."26 
In Harkness v. Hyde,21 it appeared that in an action in personani 
process out of a court of Idaho territory was served personally 
upon the defendant at his residence on an Indian reservation. The 
reservation was, by treaty with the Indians -and by legislation, put 
outside of the jurisdiction of the territory of Idaho. It was held 
that the service was invalid and the resulting judgment therefore 
void. The court said :28 
There can be no jurisdiction in a court of a territory to 
render a personal judgment against any one upon service 
made outside its limits. Personal service within its limits, 
or the voluntary appearance of the defendant is essential in 
such cases. It is only where property of a non-resident or 
of an absent defendant is brought under its control, or where 
his assent to a different mode of service is given in advance 
that it has jurisdiction to inquire into his personal liabilities 
or obligatioh.; without personal service of process upon him, 
or his voluntary appearance to the action. Our views on this 
subject are expressed at length in the late case of Pennoyer 
v. Neff (95 U. S. 714) and it is unnecessary to repeat them 
here. 
The fair deduction from these expressions of opinion by the 
Supreme Court would' seem to be that the court does not consider 
service by publication to be due process in an action strictly in per-
sonani even though the defendant ·be domiciled in and be actually 
within the state from whose court the process issues. This point 
seems to be actually involved in the decision in Webster v. Reid. 
Harkness v. Hyde had to do with a non-resident, but the statement 
in the case as quoted above is very strong to the effect that personal 
service within the state or voluntary appearance is always neces-
sary. In Knowles v. Gaslight & Coke Company and in Earle v. 
26 Settlemier v. Sullivan (1878), 97 U. S. 444, 447. 
27 (1878) 98 u. s. 476. 
28 Ibid. 478. 
•' 
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McVeigh where a broader view is intimated the court may have 
had actions in rem in mind. It is impossible to say whether the 
court would be influenced by the more liberal view of the state 
courts, if the question were now brought before it. 20 It is believed, 
however, that service by publication may without unreasonable hard-
ship to plaintiffs be restricted to actions in rem, which include 
actions commenced by attachinent. Substituted service where proc-
ess is left at the residence of the defendant, stands on a different 
footing. It is_ treated by the state courts, not as distinct from, but. 
as a kind of personal service. It is believed that the Supreme Court 
would probably take the same position in view of the expressions 
by that court quoted above, and particularly in view of the sugges-
tion to be dealt with shortly which was thrown out in the recent case 
of McDonald v. Mabee,30 that substituted service may be good even 
upon a resident defendant when out of the state. 
When a person is domiciled in a state but is temporarily outside 
of the state at the time of service of process in an action -in per-
sonam two questions are raised-has the state authority over such 
person, and if so what means of service constitute due process? It 
has been held that a court of a state may only be given jurisdiction 
over those actually within the state-that an attempt to give to a 
court jurisdiction of a person who, though domiciled within the 
state, is actually outside of the state, is an attempt to invade the 
sovereignty of the state where he is.31 However, the weight of 
authority in state courts seems to be on the other side. The theory 
is that a person domiciled in a state or country "owes allegiance to 
the country and submission to its laws. * * * By reason of the rela-
29 In the recent case of McDonald v. Mabee (I9I7), 243 U. S. go, the 
court refused to express any opinion on 'this point. 
30 243 u. s. 90. 
31 De La Montanya v. ·De La Montanya, 112 Calif. IOI, three judges dis-
senting. Similar declarations are found in Amsbaugh v. Exchange Bk., 33 
Kan. 100, though there it seems that the service was not at defendant's "usual 
place of residence," as required by the statute, and in Smith v. Grady, 68 
Wis. 2I5, though that case involved an action brought in Ontario against 
one who, though a British subject, was not a resident of Ontario and was 
served personally outside of Ontario. It is not clear whether Moss v. Fitch, 
212 Mo. 484 and Raher v. Raher, I50 Ia. 511, were meant to support the 
same proposition, or were meant only to determine that the methods of 
service there adopted were invalid. 
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tion between the State and its citizen, which affords protection to 
him and his property and imposes upon him duties as such, he may 
be charged by judgment in personani binding on him everywhere as 
the result of legal proceedings instituted and carried on in con-
formity to the statute of the State prescribing a method of service 
which is not personal and which maY. not become actital notice to 
him. And this may be accomplished iri his lawful absence from the 
State. It, therefore, becomes important to inquire whether the 
State of Wisconsin was the domicile of the defendant at the time 
the constructive service was made there, because it is upon domicile 
that his civil status depends."32 Three methods of service upon an 
absent resident have been attempted, namely, personal service out-
side of the state, service at the defendant's residence and service by 
publication. If the state has authority to give the court jurisdic-
tion of the person of a resident temporarily out of the state, service 
of process at his residence would seem to constitute due process.33 
This would seem to follow from the general view that StJ.ch service 
is valid against a resident who is within the state, and because it is 
a way reasonably likely to give him notice of the proceedings. The 
Supreme Court, though being careful not to express a definite opin-
ion on the point, has intimated that such service may be valid under 
the circumstances stated.34 Personal service on a resident while out-
side of the state has been held bad by the Supreme Court of the 
United States,35 and by the state courts.36 Although this is clearly 
32 Huntley v. Baker, 33 Hun. (N. Y.) 578, 580, cited with approval in 
de Meli v. de Meli, 120 N. Y. 485, 495, and in Teel v. Yost, 128 N. Y. 387, 
396. (This is not in conflict with Grubel v. Nassauer, 210 N. Y. 149, where 
the court refused to enforce a judgment in Germany against a German citi- o 
zen, who, however, was domiciled in New York, where the action was ill 
personam and the process was served by publication.) In accord, Sturgis v. 
Fay, 16 Ind. 429; Henderson v. Staniford, 105 Mass. 504; Fernandez v. Casey 
and Swasey, 77 Tex. 452; Ouseley v. Lehigh Val. T. and S. D. Co., 84 Fed. 
602. Fro:tMAN ON JunGMJ>NTS (4th ed.), sec. 570. 
33 Sturgis v. Fay, 16 Ind. 429; Huntley v. Baker, 33 Hun. (N. Y.) 578. 
This seems to be the effect of Botna Valley St. Bk. v. Silver City Bk., 87 
Ia. 479. Two judges in Raher v. Raher, 150 Ia. 511, expre5sly take this view; 
three do not express themselves upon this point. 
34 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. go. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Moss v. Fitch, 212 Mo. 484, overruling Hamill v. Talbott, 72 Mo. App. 
22; 81 Mo. App. 210; Raher v. Raher, 150 Ia. 511. 
SERVICE IN ACTIONS IN PERSONAM 431 
the best method of giving actual notice to an absent resident of the 
proceedings pending against him, it is held to constitute an attempt 
to give extra-territorial effect to the mandate of the state court. 
Service by publication has in one case been held invalid as against 
an absent resident.31 In another case it has been held valid.38 In a 
third jurisdiction it has been held that a judgment obtained upon 
such a service is at most voidable by the defendant, and cannot be 
treated as void by the plaintiff.39 If the Supreme Court is, as seems 
to be the case, opposed to service by publication as against a resi-
dent defendant who is within the state, a fortiori would it be against 
such service when the defendant is absent from the state. This 
also is the fair deduction from McD011ald v. Mabee.40 The English 
courts have held that a judgment against an absent resident is valid 
though based upon constructive service if sue.ti constructive service 
is authorized by law.41 
If a charter is granted by a state to a do=nestic corporation upon 
condition that service may be made upon it through some public 
officer, or by publication, such service being consented to would be 
good. Aside from any such consent it would seem that the due 
process clause would require the same sort of service upon a domes-
tic corporation as upon a resident natural person. It has been held 
that constructive service upon a domestic corporation, which does 
not have an office in the state, is due process when reasonable in 
character."'2 
Cornell University. CHARLES KELLOGG BURDICK. 
31 De La Montanya v. De La Montanya, II2 Calif. IOI; three judges dis-
senting. And see; Bernhardt v. Brown, II8 N. C. 700. 
38 Fernandez v. Casey and Swasey, :n Tex. 452. 
39 Henderson v. Staniford, 105 Mass. 504; Stockwell v. McCracken, '109 
Mass. 84-
40 243 u. s. 90. 
41 Douglas v. Forrest, 4 Bing. 686 (public proclamation in court, in the 
market place and on the seashore, according to Scottish law); Becquet v. 
MacCarthy, 2 B. & Ad. 951 (process served upon a public officer to be for-
warded to the defendant in accordance with the law of the colony); Mau-
bourquet v. Wyse, I Ir. Rep. C. L. 471 (similar decision as to French judg-
ment). 
42 Town of Hinckley v. Kettle River R. Co., 70 Minn. !05 (service of 
process upon the Secretary of State with direction to mail a copy to the office 
or to an officer of the corporation); Ward Lumber Co. v. Henderson-White 
Mfg. Co., 107 Va. 626 (service by publication). 
